New Phishing Technique Targeting Over 20 Crypto Wallets

Request Demo

Overview of the Netlify Scam

Netskope Threat Labs spotted a new crypto-phishing attack that aims to steal sensitive data from crypto wallets, including private keys and security recovery phrases, disguising itself as a service to revoke stolen ERC (Ethereum Request for Comments) assets. The page was created and hosted with Netlify, which is a free cloud service to create websites and apps.

What makes this Netlify scamming technique novel is that the attacker is targeting 21 cryptocurrency wallets in the same page, eliminating the need to maintain individual websites for each type of crypto wallet, like we saw in the crypto-phishing campaigns we spotted in August and September. Those attacks were targeting multiple crypto wallets through a chained phishing attack abusing Google Sites and Microsoft Azure.

In this blog post, we will analyze this phishing page to demonstrate how this new technique works.

How the Netlify Crypto Phishing Attack Works

The phishing page is hosted with Netlify and the main page tries to lure the victim by mimicking a service to revoke stolen ERC assets. To lure the user to use the fake service the page offers a fake connection with 21 different cryptocurrency wallets, which include:

MetaMask
Trust
Coinbase
crypto.com
Blockchain
Binance Smart Chain
Safepal
Argent
Fortmatic
Aktionariat
Keyring Pro
BitKeep
SparkPoint
OwnBit
Infinity Wallet
Wallet.io
Infinito
Torus
Nash
BitPay
imToken

Screenshot of the main phishing webpage, hosted on Netlify. — *Phishing’s main webpage, hosted on Netlify.*

Once the victim selects a cryptocurrency wallet to connect, the phishing page displays a fake modal that simulates a connection with the wallet’s service.

Example ofphishing simulating an initialization process with MetaMask. — Phishing simulating an initialization process with MetaMask.

Then, a new modal is displayed, asking the victim for sensitive data in order to proceed with the fake revoking service. It tries to steal three different types of data. The first one is the cryptocurrency private key.

In this specific modal, there’s even a typo in the word “Revoke”.

Screenshot of phishing trying to steal the private key from a crypto wallet. — Phishing trying to steal the private key from a crypto wallet.

The second piece of data it tries to steal is the security recovery phrase, which can be used to import the wallet, as we explained in a previous blog post.

Screenshot of phishing trying to steal the security recovery phrase from a crypto wallet — Phishing trying to steal the security recovery phrase from a crypto wallet.

And lastly, it tries to steal a keystore file in JSON format.

Screenshot of phishing trying to steal the keystore file from a crypto wallet. — Phishing trying to steal the keystore file from a crypto wallet.

Once the “Revoke Signature” button is clicked, the webpage sends the sensitive data to the attacker through a POST request to the same page.

Example of POST request sending the private key to the attacker. — POST request sending the private key to the attacker.

Finally, after stealing the data, the page shows a message that says it was not possible to revoke and asks to try for another digital wallet. It also automatically closes the modal and opens a new one for a different wallet.

Screenshot of fake message displayed by the phishing page. — Fake message displayed by the phishing page.

These three pieces of sensitive data (privacy key, recovery phrase, and keystore JSON) that the attacker tries to steal can be all used to provide access to someone’s crypto wallet, allowing the attacker to exfiltrate currency.

Aside from these 21 targets, the webpage also contains an option to connect to “Other Wallets”, increasing the attack surface even more, covering possible crypto wallets that are not listed by the attacker.

Conclusions

This cryptocurrency wallet phishing technique shows how an attacker can increase the chances of success and also reduce their costs by targeting multiple crypto wallets at the same time with a single page hosted with a cloud application. We strongly recommend individuals to not enter sensitive details, such as private keys and secret recovery phrases, on unknown websites. If you’ve lost access to your account, please contact the official support for your wallet to verify the correct steps to follow.

Protection

Netskope Threat Labs is actively monitoring this campaign and has ensured coverage for all known threat indicators.

IOCs

Phishing URL

hxxps://revolknfts.netlify[.]app/index

Gustavo Palazolo

Gustavo Palazolo is an expert in malware analysis, reverse engineering and security research, working many years in projects related to electronic fraud protection.