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Netskope Threat Research Labs recently observed new strains of Microsoft Office macro-based document malware that extensively uses cloud storage services for downloading the second-stage malware payload. The macro-based malware is using either VBScript or PowerShell scripts. Netskope Threat Protection detects these macro-based malware as Backdoor.Generckd.4622234, W97M.Downloadr.FCG, and Backdoor.Generckd.4574697. The Netskope Active Platform can proactively protect customers by blocking the download of the second-stage malware from these cloud storage services, especially those services whose enterprise readiness score is poor as per the Netskope Cloud Confidence Index (CCI).
The malicious macro code is embedded in Microsoft Office files using VBScript or PowerShell Script. A default Microsoft Office installation disables macros by default and will not execute macros automatically. Malware authors craft enticing messages in the documents, thereby convincing users to enable macros manually when the document is opened. As shown in Figure 1, if the user clicks the “Enable Content” option, the malicious code will execute, thereby downloading the second-stage payload to the user’s machine. We are observing a steady increase in the use of Cloud Storage services for hosting the second-stage payload to infect the end users’ devices. The usage of cloud storage service URLs in malicious macros is a significant evolution in the threat landscape.
In the new strains that we have analyzed, we found malicious macros that contained links to the cloud storage service 1Fichier, which hosted the second-stage payload. 1Fichier is a France-based cloud storage service that scores a “poor” and a numeric score of “11” out of “100” in the Netskope CCI. Netskope Threat Research Labs notes that 1Fichier has enterprise readiness gaps in all segments but one of the CCI measurements, including Certifications & Standards, Data Protection, Access Control, Auditability, Disaster Recovery & Business Continuity, and Legal & Privacy. In the rest of the blog, we provide an analysis of these new strains with the first being the latest variant of the Stampado ransomware, which is using PowerShell script with references to 1Fichier. This latest variant encrypts 1,342 file extensions, including extensions created when files are encrypted by other ransomware. We also provide an analysis of another macro-based malware using VBScript with references to 1Fichier.
Both of the macro-based documents we analyzed use VBscript and PowerShell to download the second-stage payload from 1Fichier. The macro code in the documents was not obfuscated and only had the downloader functionality code called from the Auto_Open() function.
Macro with PowerShell Script and Stampado Ransomware
This macro-based document, when executed, displays a message to “Enable Content” as shown in Figure 1. When the content is enabled, it downloads the second-stage payload.
Figure 1: Message displayed on execution of the macro-based document with PowerShell scriptThe PowerShell code to download the second-stage payload from 1Fichier is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: PowerShell code with reference to downloading content from 1Fichier
At the time of analysis, this second-stage payload delivered the latest variant of Stampado ransomware detected by Netskope Threat Protection as Backdoor.Generckd.4637645. The Stampado ransomware was compiled with AutoIt and packed with a UPX packer. The analysis and functionality of this ransomware has been documented by BleepingComputer. We will detail the key functionalities and some new features of Stampado.
On execution, the sample drops a copy of itself in %Appdata%, named scvhost.exe and drops two files in the desktop named “How to recover my files.txt” and “Recover my files.exe,” related to recovery instructions. The encrypted files are renamed to the extension, “.locked.” The “Recover my files.exe” binary displaying the ransomware note is shown in Figure 3. The email address used for communications related to recovery is [email protected].
Figure 3: Stampado ransomware note
Stampado Ransomware File Extensions
This variant of Stampado ransomware encrypts files with 1,342 different file extensions, certainly among the most comprehensive we have seen. The file extensions are listed in the appendix at the end of this article.
Interestingly, Stampado ransomware also encrypts files encrypted by other ransomware. The following are the 41 file extensions belonging to other ransomware that are also encrypted by Stampado ransomware.
“*.pdcr;*.EnCiPhErEd;*.xyz;*.pzdc;*.kkk;*.PoAr2w;*.czvxce;*.magic;*.odcodc;*.rdm;*.windows10;*.payms;*.p5tkjw;*.fun;*.btc;*.darkness;*.kraken;*.crptrgr;*.legion;*.kernel_time;*.kernel_complete;*.rokku;*.bin;*.kernel_pid;*.73i87A;*.kimcilware;*.SecureCrypted;*.CCCRRRPPP;*.vvv;*.kratos;*.herbst;*.payrms;*.bitstak;*.paymts;*.paymst;*.pays;*.paym;*.info;*.padcrypt;*.paymrss;*.szf”
It is also interesting to find the entries created by KeRanger OSX ransomware, “.kernel_pid”, “.kernel_time” and “.kernel_complete” in the above list. At this time we cannot speculate the reason to specify a Mac OS X based ransomware file extension in a windows based ransomware variant. It is possible that the malware author is working on a Mac OS X variant of Stampado.
Countries/Regions of Interest
The AutoIt script also shows messages related to several languages for displaying the ransomware notes. Apart from English, other languages include Russian, Polish, Italian, Mongolian, and Dutch, as shown in Figure 4.
