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Blast from the past
Classic network IP allow lists were probably catching on when these songs were popular:
Decades later, the internet appears to still be up in arms about this classic rocky concept:
If applying IP allow lists to the cloud excites you as much Another One Bites the Dust on volume 11, read on.
In this blog, I’ll discuss some considerations regarding operationalizing, automating, and increasing the efficacy of IP allow lists in your cloud infrastructure. Although this discussion will be in the context of cloud infrastructure providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure, it should also be applicable to other cloud infrastructure and application environments.
IP allow lists
IP allow lists are conceptually simple: we have a list of CIDRs, we compare incoming traffic or requests against this list, and allow it if it matches. In classic networking scenarios, the incoming traffic would be evaluated against network filters such as firewall/router rules at layers 3 and 4.
With the cloud it’s a little more complicated, not in its core definition, but more so how it relates to cloud concepts and services. We are still talking about TCP/IP, but the application areas of allow lists can involve more than just network ACLs or firewall rules applied to VPCs/subnets. They might apply to security groups protecting compute instances, console access, or API access over https. There are often specific resources or API activity that is restricted, and the IP allow lists might be associated with or applied at a larger boundary or organization level, as well as at a granular resource level.
To discuss operationalizing IP allow lists in the cloud, I’d like to touch on four basic areas or stages:
- Policy definition
- Implementation
- Configuration drift
- Monitoring / logging
Traditionally, implementation receives a lot of attention, and I’d like to give thought to the other stages, which can make maintenance and effectiveness of an IP allow list approach more feasible.
IP allow lists can be useful as an additional security layer for mitigating compromised credentials when combined with other controls, such as MFA, as we’ve discussed in previous blogs. For a cloud example of this scenario, organizations such as Netflix have applied this to AWS EC2 instances and temporary tokens to help mitigate compromised token scenarios.
Policy definition
One area that I think is underemphasized is what I call policy definition of the IP allow list. Fancy jargon aside, there needs to be agreement on how and where to actually specify what amounts to a security policy: a list of IPv4 CIDR ranges that reflect approved or authorized source IPs for the cloud resources that are being accessed. With that there are several areas to consider and plan for:
- Format: We need to determine the format of the CIDR list. This is as simple as agreeing on something like a CSV format or perhaps it’s a .json format utilized by the cloud service provider being used. The reason this is important, is that the rest of the operational workflow may need to parse or write this same format, yet it should be clear and concise for the human administrator so it can be maintained easily.
- Master copy: Rather than every administrator having a copy and no one knowing where the latest version is, it behooves each organization to think about where to store it. The last thing any organization needs is to question which IP allow list “should” be in production.
First preference would be to use the corporate standard for source control, e.g. GitHub. However, even an agreed-upon directory on a backed-up, shared file system with file versioning would be acceptable.
- Change management: The next decision is to decide how much of a change management control and change auditing is desired. Advantages of a source control system include: versioning, comments, audit trail, and access control features.
- Maintenance: Finally, IP allow lists can become quite large, and being able to maintain the list by removing outdated or inaccurate CIDRs is important. We’ll discuss this more in the Monitoring / Auditing section.
Implementation
This tends to be the focus for many people, and it certainly is important to be able to implement this effectively, within the cloud environment you have. There are often multiple areas where IP allow lists can be applied, so examples below will use some of the more common ones.
1.Static CIDRs:
For IP allow lists to be maintainable, it’s important to try to stabilize the list of CIDRs as much as possible. In a post-COVID world, there are likely more employees or workers who work from home, in higher numbers. Trying to adjust for all the dynamic IP ranges from home ISPs, will make IP allow lists a nightmare that includes FPs and FNs and angers users.
Rather than going down the path of trying to maintain a large list of dynamic, consumer IPs, VPNs have been used in the past to restrict the allowed CIDR ranges to a smaller set of static, corporate egress points. A VPN requires users to effectively connect through well-known networks and egress IPs in order to access cloud infrastructure. Cloud VPNs or Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solutions (e.g. Netskope) help in greatly reducing the cloud resources that need to be reached from the public internet. Those access methods themselves may employ IP allow lists but the maintenance problem is much smaller.
Today, the cloud/Internet also offers other approaches, including the advent of efficient CASBs, lightweight steering agents, secure web gateways, and other proxies (e.g., Netskope), it’s feasible to require the remote worker to first go through corporate networking before accessing cloud applications. This means that the cloud infrastructure side can implement IP allow lists that have only the corporate list of CIDRs, instead of including home IP addresses of remote workers.
The work here could be significant with a large organization, but reducing the public IP footprint of client access is important not just to implement an IP allow list control, but overall for reducing the work with general security controls.
Assuming, this has been optimized as much as possible, let’s look at how the implementation is across AWS, GCP, and Azure.
2. GCP
IP allow listing should be implemented with VPC Service Controls found in Google Cloud Console > Security > VPC Service Controls, using an access level based on IP address defined in Google Cloud Console > Security > Access Context Manager.
When implemented, users attempting to call the specified APIs from a non-authorized source IP will get an access denied error:
another-host:~ $ gsutil ls -l gs://bucket-foo-dev-mfa
AccessDeniedException: 403 Request is prohibited